vendor: Update vendor logic

This commit is contained in:
Clayton Coleman 2020-04-08 14:34:43 -04:00
parent c6ac5cbc87
commit 4ca64b85f0
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 3D16906B4F1C5CB3
1540 changed files with 265304 additions and 91616 deletions

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@ -23,16 +23,24 @@ import (
"net/http"
"time"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
utilerrors "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/errors"
"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/util/sets"
"k8s.io/apiserver/pkg/authentication/authenticator"
"k8s.io/apiserver/pkg/authentication/user"
"k8s.io/component-base/metrics"
"k8s.io/component-base/metrics/legacyregistry"
)
var clientCertificateExpirationHistogram = prometheus.NewHistogram(
prometheus.HistogramOpts{
/*
* By default, the following metric is defined as falling under
* ALPHA stability level https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/blob/master/keps/sig-instrumentation/20190404-kubernetes-control-plane-metrics-stability.md#stability-classes)
*
* Promoting the stability level of the metric is a responsibility of the component owner, since it
* involves explicitly acknowledging support for the metric across multiple releases, in accordance with
* the metric stability policy.
*/
var clientCertificateExpirationHistogram = metrics.NewHistogram(
&metrics.HistogramOpts{
Namespace: "apiserver",
Subsystem: "client",
Name: "certificate_expiration_seconds",
@ -53,11 +61,12 @@ var clientCertificateExpirationHistogram = prometheus.NewHistogram(
(6 * 30 * 24 * time.Hour).Seconds(),
(12 * 30 * 24 * time.Hour).Seconds(),
},
StabilityLevel: metrics.ALPHA,
},
)
func init() {
prometheus.MustRegister(clientCertificateExpirationHistogram)
legacyregistry.MustRegister(clientCertificateExpirationHistogram)
}
// UserConversion defines an interface for extracting user info from a client certificate chain
@ -73,16 +82,28 @@ func (f UserConversionFunc) User(chain []*x509.Certificate) (*authenticator.Resp
return f(chain)
}
// VerifyOptionFunc is function which provides a shallow copy of the VerifyOptions to the authenticator. This allows
// for cases where the options (particularly the CAs) can change. If the bool is false, then the returned VerifyOptions
// are ignored and the authenticator will express "no opinion". This allows a clear signal for cases where a CertPool
// is eventually expected, but not currently present.
type VerifyOptionFunc func() (x509.VerifyOptions, bool)
// Authenticator implements request.Authenticator by extracting user info from verified client certificates
type Authenticator struct {
opts x509.VerifyOptions
user UserConversion
verifyOptionsFn VerifyOptionFunc
user UserConversion
}
// New returns a request.Authenticator that verifies client certificates using the provided
// VerifyOptions, and converts valid certificate chains into user.Info using the provided UserConversion
func New(opts x509.VerifyOptions, user UserConversion) *Authenticator {
return &Authenticator{opts, user}
return NewDynamic(StaticVerifierFn(opts), user)
}
// NewDynamic returns a request.Authenticator that verifies client certificates using the provided
// VerifyOptionFunc (which may be dynamic), and converts valid certificate chains into user.Info using the provided UserConversion
func NewDynamic(verifyOptionsFn VerifyOptionFunc, user UserConversion) *Authenticator {
return &Authenticator{verifyOptionsFn, user}
}
// AuthenticateRequest authenticates the request using presented client certificates
@ -92,7 +113,11 @@ func (a *Authenticator) AuthenticateRequest(req *http.Request) (*authenticator.R
}
// Use intermediates, if provided
optsCopy := a.opts
optsCopy, ok := a.verifyOptionsFn()
// if there are intentionally no verify options, then we cannot authenticate this request
if !ok {
return nil, false, nil
}
if optsCopy.Intermediates == nil && len(req.TLS.PeerCertificates) > 1 {
optsCopy.Intermediates = x509.NewCertPool()
for _, intermediate := range req.TLS.PeerCertificates[1:] {
@ -124,17 +149,23 @@ func (a *Authenticator) AuthenticateRequest(req *http.Request) (*authenticator.R
// Verifier implements request.Authenticator by verifying a client cert on the request, then delegating to the wrapped auth
type Verifier struct {
opts x509.VerifyOptions
auth authenticator.Request
verifyOptionsFn VerifyOptionFunc
auth authenticator.Request
// allowedCommonNames contains the common names which a verified certificate is allowed to have.
// If empty, all verified certificates are allowed.
allowedCommonNames sets.String
allowedCommonNames StringSliceProvider
}
// NewVerifier create a request.Authenticator by verifying a client cert on the request, then delegating to the wrapped auth
func NewVerifier(opts x509.VerifyOptions, auth authenticator.Request, allowedCommonNames sets.String) authenticator.Request {
return &Verifier{opts, auth, allowedCommonNames}
return NewDynamicCAVerifier(StaticVerifierFn(opts), auth, StaticStringSlice(allowedCommonNames.List()))
}
// NewDynamicCAVerifier create a request.Authenticator by verifying a client cert on the request, then delegating to the wrapped auth
// TODO make the allowedCommonNames dynamic
func NewDynamicCAVerifier(verifyOptionsFn VerifyOptionFunc, auth authenticator.Request, allowedCommonNames StringSliceProvider) authenticator.Request {
return &Verifier{verifyOptionsFn, auth, allowedCommonNames}
}
// AuthenticateRequest verifies the presented client certificate, then delegates to the wrapped auth
@ -144,7 +175,11 @@ func (a *Verifier) AuthenticateRequest(req *http.Request) (*authenticator.Respon
}
// Use intermediates, if provided
optsCopy := a.opts
optsCopy, ok := a.verifyOptionsFn()
// if there are intentionally no verify options, then we cannot authenticate this request
if !ok {
return nil, false, nil
}
if optsCopy.Intermediates == nil && len(req.TLS.PeerCertificates) > 1 {
optsCopy.Intermediates = x509.NewCertPool()
for _, intermediate := range req.TLS.PeerCertificates[1:] {
@ -163,12 +198,14 @@ func (a *Verifier) AuthenticateRequest(req *http.Request) (*authenticator.Respon
func (a *Verifier) verifySubject(subject pkix.Name) error {
// No CN restrictions
if len(a.allowedCommonNames) == 0 {
if len(a.allowedCommonNames.Value()) == 0 {
return nil
}
// Enforce CN restrictions
if a.allowedCommonNames.Has(subject.CommonName) {
return nil
for _, allowedCommonName := range a.allowedCommonNames.Value() {
if allowedCommonName == subject.CommonName {
return nil
}
}
return fmt.Errorf("x509: subject with cn=%s is not in the allowed list", subject.CommonName)
}